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TO RUHQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 7781
INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0388
RUFHQ/AMEMBASSY BONN 3299
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RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1994
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 277901/01

E.O. 12065: RDS-1,3 10/22/99 (PECK, ROBERT A.)

TAGS: PEPR, AF, US, PK, IR, IN, UR, CH

SUBJECT: US-PAK TALKS: REGIONAL ISSUES

REFERENCES: (A) STATE 270484; (B) STATE 274950

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: OVER HALF OF THE FORMAL DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE PAKISTANI AND US DELEGATIONS OCTOBER 16-17 IN WASHINGTON WAS DEVOTED TO REGIONAL ISSUES. OUR ASSESSMENTS ON AFGHANISTAN WERE QUITE SIMILAR, THOUGH THE PAKISTANIS VIEWED THE THREAT IN SOMEWHAT MORE IMMEDIATE TERMS THAN DO WE. THE PAKISTANIS WERE FAIRLY RELAXED ABOUT THE STATE OF THE CURRENT RELATIONS WITH INDIA, BUT STILL CONSIDER INDIA TO BE PAKISTAN'S PRINCIPAL LONG-RANGE SECURITY THREAT. ON IRAN, SHAHI EMPHASIZED THE IMPORTANCE OF ESTABLISHING A PERSONAL EQUATION WITH KHOMEINI AND INDICATED THAT PAKISTAN WAS TRYING TO SAVE THE RCD IN THE FACE OF IRANIAN OPPOSITION. THE US STRONGLY REAFFIRMED ITS SUPPORT FOR PAKISTANI SECURITY, BUT WE INDICATED THAT OUR ABILITY TO EXPRESS THIS SUPPORT IN PRACTICAL TERMS WOULD REMAIN CONSTRAINED AS LONG AS OUR DIFFERENCES OVER THE NUCLEAR ISSUE WERE UNRESOLVED. THE US ALSO REAFFIRMED THAT IN THE EVENT OF AFGHAN AGGRESSION AGAINST PAKISTAN WE WOULD CONSIDER THE 1959 BILATERAL AGREEMENT TO BE RELEVANT (SEPTEL). DISCUSSION OF THE NUCLEAR ISSUE, CHINA AND THE INDIAN OCEAN ALSO COVERED IN SEPARATE TELEGRAMS. END SUMMARY.

3. THE FIRST DAY OF DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN THE US AND PAKISTANI DELEGATIONS AT THE DEPARTMENT (OCTOBER 16) WAS DEVOTED LARGELY TO REGIONAL ISSUES. ON THE PAKISTANI SIDE, THE DISCUSSION WAS LED BY FOREIGN AFFAIRS ADVISOR AGHA SHAHI AND FOREIGN SECRETARY SHAHNAVAZ, WITH SOME CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, GEN. GHULAM JILANI KHAN. ON THE US SIDE THE SECRETARY LED OFF WITH AN OPENING STATEMENT (REFTEL A) AND PARTICIPATED IN MUCH OF THE SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSIONS. UNDER SECRETARY NEWSOM PROVIDED AN OVERVIEW OF US INTERESTS IN THE REGION.

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4. AFGHANISTAN: THE TWO DELEGATIONS TRADED ASSESSMENTS OF THE INTERNAL AFGHAN SITUATION AND THE THREAT AFGHANISTAN POSED TO PAKISTANI SECURITY. SHAHI SAID THAT THE AFGHAN REVOLUTION HAD AFFECTED PAKISTAN PROFOUNDLY. THE HISTORICAL ROLE OF AFGHANISTAN AS A BUFFER STATE HAD DISAPPEARED, AND PAKISTAN FOUND ITSELF ILL-PREPARED AND ILL-EQUIPPED TO MEET THE MILITARY THREAT. PAKISTAN DID NOT EXPECT AN IMMEDIATE INVASION, BUT WAS DEEPLY CONCERNED OVER THE LONG-TERM POTENTIAL FOR CROSS-BORDER SUBVERSION.

5. INTERNAL SITUATION: SHAHI SAID THAT THE MARXIST REGIME IN KABUL REMAINED "OFF BALANCE" IN THE FACE OF THE CONTINUING INSURGENCY AND INTERNAL PARTY AND MILITARY DISSIDENCE. THE POLITICAL BASE OF THE REGIME WAS EVEN NARROWER FOLLOWING AMIN'S INTERNAL COUP. AT THE SAME TIME, THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL HOLD OF THE SOVIET UNION ON AFGHANISTAN WAS STRONGER THAN EVER AND APPEARED TO BE GROWING. THE SOVIETS FOCUSED ON CONSOLIDATION OF THE REVOLUTION AND PERSONALITIES DID NOT MATTER. SOVIET AMBASSADOR PUZANOV HAD RECENTLY WARNED DEPARTING PAKISTANI AMBASSADOR PIRACHA THAT PAKISTAN SHOULD NOW THINK SERIOUSLY ABOUT CHANGING ITS POLICIES TOWARD AFGHANISTAN SINCE THE USSR WAS DETERMINED TO DEFEND THE REVOLUTION. PUZANOV SAID THAT BY SPRING THE SOVIET UNION WOULD HAVE CREATED A "NEW AFGHAN ARMY" THAT WOULD THEN BE IN A GOOD POSITION TO MOUNT AN EFFECTIVE MILITARY CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE INSURGENTS.

6. SHAHI ARGUED THAT ONCE THE REGIME HAD CONSOLIDATED ITS POSITION, IT WOULD TURN ITS NEWLY ACQUIRED MILITARY CAPABILITY AGAINST PAKISTAN. PAKISTAN VIEWED THE THREAT AS BEING ONE TO TWO YEARS OFF, DEPENDING ON THE PACE OF INTERNAL CONSOLIDATION IN AFGHANISTAN. THE TIME TO DO SOMETHING WAS NOW.

7. THE PAKISTANIS INDICATED THEY WERE EVEN MORE UNCOMFORTABLE WITH AMIN'S ONE-MAN RULE THAN THEY HAD BEEN WITH THE PREVIOUS REGIME. WHILE AMIN HAD MADE SOME PUBLIC STATEMENTS, APPARENTLY AT SOVIET URGING, REGARDING A DESIRE FOR BETTER RELATIONS, HE HAD ALSO GIVEN CONTRARY SIGNALS. THE PAKISTANIS HAD BEEN PARTICULARLY CONCERNED BY THE PRESENCE OF EXILED PUSHTUN NATIONALIST LEADER AJMAL KHATTAK AT A RECENT PUBLIC MEETING IN KABUL, AT WHICH KHATTAK WAS GIVEN EQUAL STATUS WITH DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES ASSEMBLED TO HEAR OF PLANS FOR A NEW CONSTITUTION. SHAHNAWAZ CHARACTERIZED THE REGIME AS A MIXTURE OF PUSHTUN CHAUVINISM AND IDEOLOGICAL MISSIONARY ZEAL, A COMBINATION WHICH POSED A DOUBLE THREAT TO PAKISTANI INTERESTS.

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INFO RUMJPG/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0389

RUFGOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 3300

RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0271

RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0033

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8190

RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1995

RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1387

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 04 STATE 277901/02

8. THE PAKISTANIS DID NOT PLACE MUCH HOPE IN THEIR DIPLOMATIC DIALOGUE WITH AFGHANISTAN, BUT INDICATED THEY WOULD KEEP TRYING. SHAHI SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER THE INVITATION TO HIM TO VISIT KABUL WOULD BE RENEWED. IN ANY CASE, THE DIALOGUE SEEMED MORE IN THE AFGHAN INTEREST THAN IN PAKISTAN'S INTEREST. THE AFGHANS WANTED TO GET PAKISTAN TO FORCE THE REFUGEES BACK ACROSS THE BORDER. (SHAHNAWAZ PRIVATELY SAID WHAT THE AFGHANS REALLY WANTED WAS THE EXPULSION OF KADEL LEADERS, AND WERE NOT PREPARED TO TALK SERIOUSLY ABOUT ANY OTHER ISSUES. THEIR PURPOSE WAS TWO-FOLD. FIRST, THEY WOULD BE BETTER ABLE TO COPE WITH THE INSURGENCY IF THE PAKISTANI REFUGEE WAS UNAVAILABLE AND, SECONDLY, THEY WANTED TO CREATE A SITUATION IN WHICH THEY COULD AGAIN POSE AS THE CHAMPIONS OF PUSHTUN NATIONALISM. IF THEY COULD FORCE PAKISTAN TO ABANDON THE REFUGEES, PAKISTAN WOULD BE DISCREDITED AND THE DRA WOULD HAVE A BETTER LONG-RANGE CHANCE TO RALLY THE TRIBES TO THEIR SIDE.

9. THE SECRETARY ASKED IF PAKISTAN SAW THE DANGER FROM AFGHANISTAN AS ONE OF LONG-RUN SUBVERSION OR DIRECT MILITARY AGGRESSION. SHAHI REPLIED THAT BOTH WERE A CONCERN, BUT WENT ON TO DISCUSS PRIMARILY THE SUBVERSIVE THREAT. THE AFGHANS, HE SAID, WERE GIVING UP ON THE OLDER GENERATION OF PUSHTUN NATIONALISTS AND WERE CONCENTRATING ON A YOUNGER GENERATION OF PUSHTUNS AND BALUCHIS WHO WERE SHOWING MARXIST TENDENCIES. THE INTELLECTUAL SUBVERSION OF THE PAKISTANI PEOPLE WAS ALREADY SHOWING SOME SIGNS OF SUCCESS, AND MANY PAKISTANIS WERE SHIFTING THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARD AFGHANISTAN. WHEN THE AFGHAN COUP FIRST OCCURRED, THERE WAS BROAD SUPPORT IN PAKISTAN FOR MEASURES TO HELP THE REFUGEES AND ASSIST THE INSURGENTS. MANY PAKISTANIS WERE NOW COMING AROUND TO THE VIEW THAT

AFGHANISTAN -- AND THE SOVIETS THROUGH AFGHANISTAN -- NEEDED TO BE "ACCOMMODATED" SINCE PAKISTAN HAD BEEN UNABLE TO ACQUIRE ADEQUATE OUTSIDE SUPPORT. SOME PAKISTANI TRIBESMEN ARGUED THAT IT WAS PAKISTAN'S DUTY TO FIGHT THE ANTI-ISLAMIC AND MARXIST REGIME IN KABUL BUT, IF THE GOP WAS TOO AFRAID OF THE RUSSIANS TO DO SO, THEN PAKISTAN SHOULD MAKE ITS PEACE WITH THE SOVIET UNION. PAKISTANI LEADERS WORRIED THAT, IF AFGHANISTAN PUT PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN IN THE PRESENT SITUATION (E.G., BY A POLICY OF HOT PURSUIT ACROSS THE BORDERS, DISTRIBUTION OF ARMS IN BALUCHISTAN OR PROVOKING AN INSURGENCY), PAKISTAN WOULD BE IN A VERY DIFFICULT POSITION.

10. ASKED IF PAKISTAN ANTICIPATED THE DIRECT PARTICIPATION OF SOVIET TROOPS IN PUTTING DOWN THE INSURGENCY, SHAHNAWAZ SAID HE COULD NOT GIVE A CATEGORICAL ANSWER. THE SOVIETS CLEARLY WOULD GIVE WHATEVER ASSISTANCE WAS NECESSARY TO AFGHANISTAN, INCLUDING MILITARY AID. HE THOUGHT THEY WOULD TRY TO LIMIT THE PARTICIPATION OF SOVIET TROOPS TO ADVISORY AND SUPPORT ROLES. ASKED IF PAKISTAN HAD ANY EVIDENCE OF THE USE OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIAN TROOPS MINGLED IN WITH AFGHANS, SHAHNAWAZ OBSERVED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD THIS CAPABILITY. HE THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIET UNION WOULD USE CUBANS IN AFGHANISTAN SINCE THEY HAD THEIR OWN CENTRAL ASIAN TROOPS TO DRAW ON WHO WERE CULTURALLY MORE ASSIMILABLE.

11. ASKED IF THE PAKISTANIS SAW CHINA AS PLAYING A MAJOR ROLE IN CONTAINING GROWING SOVIET INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN, SHAHI SAID THEY DID NOT. THEY HAD ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS TALKED WITH THE CHINESE ABOUT AFGHANISTAN, BUT THE CHINESE FELL BACK ON AN IDEOLOGICAL ANALYSIS FROM WHICH THEY CONCLUDED THAT THE AFGHAN PEOPLE WOULD ULTIMATELY BE VICTORIOUS. THE CHINESE HAD ADOPTED A HANDS-OFF POLICY. THERE WERE ALLEGATIONS THAT THE INSURGENTS WERE RECEIVING ARMS FROM THE CHINESE, BUT PAKISTAN HAD NO EVIDENCE OF THIS.

12. INDIA: THE EXCHANGE ON INDIA CONTAINED NO SURPRISES. THE PAKISTANIS VOICED FAMILIAR CONCERNS ABOUT LONG-RANGE INDIAN INTENTIONS AND INDICATED THAT THEY CONTINUE TO CONSIDER INDIA THE PRINCIPAL THREAT TO PAKISTANI SECURITY, DESPITE THE IMMEDIACY OF THEIR PROBLEMS WITH AFGHANISTAN.

13. SHAHI NOTED THAT PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH INDIA WERE MORE "TENSION-FREE" THAN AT ANY TIME IN THE PAST. THEY GAVE CONSIDERABLE CREDIT TO FORMER PRIME MINISTER DESAI, AND WERE PARTICULARLY APPRECIATIVE OF DESAI HAVING STOOD UP TO BREZHNEV AND KOSYGIN IN MOSCOW BY REFUSING TO PUT

PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN OVER AFGHANISTAN. THIS WAS, SHAHI SAID, A "HEALTHY DEVELOPMENT". THE PAKISTANIS NONETHELESS EXPRESSED CONSIDERABLE ANXIETY REGARDING THE POLICIES WHICH MIGHT BE PURSUED BY WHATEVER INDIAN GOVERNMENT WOULD EMERGE FROM THE NEXT ELECTION.

14. SHAHNAWAZ SAID THAT PAKISTAN HAD TRIED PARTICULARLY HARD IN RECENT MONTHS TO KEEP RELATIONS WITH INDIA AS SATISFACTORY

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TO RUSQD/AMEMBASSY IS AMABAD PRIORITY 7783

INFO RUHJPG/AMEMBASSY IJING 0390

RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BOMB 001

RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0272

RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0234

RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8191

RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1996

RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1388

RUQMR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 5137

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 04 STATE 277901/03

ISFACTORY AS POSSIBLE IN VIEW OF THE SITUATION IN AFGHAN-
ISTAN. HE NOTED THAT, DURING HIS VISIT TO NEW DELHI IN
MAY, HE HAD CONDUCTED PAKISTAN'S FIRST WIDE-RANGING
EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH INDIAN OFFICIALS. ON AFGHANISTAN,
HE HAD FOUND THE INDIANS EXTREMELY CAUTIOUS IN EXPRESSING
THEMSELVES, POSSIBLY OUT OF FEAR THAT THEIR VIEWS WOULD
GET BACK TO THE SOVIETS. SHAHNAWAZ SPECULATED THAT THE
INDIANS ARE PROBABLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE DANGER WHICH
SOVIET ADVANCES IN AFGHANISTAN POSES FOR INDIA ITSELF AND
CANNOT BE PLEASED THAT AFGHANISTAN IS NO LONGER A BUFFER
STATE. THESE CONCERNS, HOWEVER, HAD NOT REACHED THE POINT
WHERE THE INDIANS WOULD ADMIT THEM OPENLY. NONETHELESS,
PAKISTAN'S EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH INDIA ON THIS ISSUE MAY
HAVE HAD SOME IMPACT. ASKED IF THE INDIANS HAD AT ANY TIME
EXPRESSED THEIR CONCERNS TO THE SOVIETS ABOUT AFGHANISTAN,
SHAHNAWAZ SAID HE THOUGHT THEY HAD NOT, BUT THAT THEY HAD
DEMONSTRATED THIS CONCERN BY RESISTING SOVIET REQUESTS FOR
PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN.

15. THE PAKISTANIS DEVELOPED THE THEME THAT THEY HAD HAD
FULL AND FRANK DISCUSSIONS WITH INDIAN OFFICIALS ON THE
NUCLEAR QUESTION AND THAT INDIA ACCEPTED PAKISTANI
ASSURANCES OF PEACEFUL INTENT AT FACE VALUE. SHAHI
RECOUNTED HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH INDIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
MISHRA IN BOTH HAVANA AND NEW YORK IN WHICH SHAHI OFFERED
TO GIVE WHATEVER ASSURANCES INDIA MIGHT REQUIRE IF INDIA
HAD DOUBTS REGARDING THE NATURE OF PAKISTAN'S PROGRAM.
SHAHI SAID HE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER CHARAN SINGH'S
RED FORT STATEMENT. MISHRA REPORTEDLY REPLIED THAT THIS
HAD BEEN MADE IN THE HYPOTHETICAL CONTEXT OF A PAKISTANI
NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM. SHAHI INDICATED THAT MISHRA WAS
SATISFIED BY PAKISTANI ASSURANCES.

16. SHAHNAWAZ CHINED IN TO POINT OUT THAT THE RED FORT STATEMENT CAME ONLY A FEW DAYS AFTER SENATOR PERCY'S REMARKS IN CALCUTTA REGARDING THE POTENTIAL THREAT TO INDIA'S CITIES OF A PAKISTANI BOMB. (WHILE HE DID NOT DRAW THE CONCLUSION SHARPLY, SHAHNAWAZ SEEMED TO BE IMPLYING THAT THE US BORE SOME RESPONSIBILITY FOR CHAAN SINGH'S OUTBURST.)

17. SHAHNAWAZ ALSO DESCRIBED IN SOME DETAIL HIS DISCUSSION OF THE NUCLEAR ISSUE WITH INDIAN LEADERS, INCLUDING FORMER PRIME MINISTER DESAI, IN DELHI LAST MAY. HE SAID DESAI MADE A "COMPLETELY UNAMBIGUOUS STATEMENT" THAT HE WAS SATISFIED WITH PAKISTANI ASSURANCES. SHAHNAWAZ ALSO WENT OVER FAMILIAR GROUND ON THE DESAI-ZIA CORRESPONDENCE IN WHICH ZIA REPORTEDLY SUGGESTED A JOINT STATEMENT RENOUNCING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND DESAI COUNTERED WITH A PROPOSAL FOR UNILATERAL STATEMENTS WHICH WOULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF A JOINT STATEMENT. SHAHNAWAZ CONCLUDED THAT, SINCE BOTH DESAI AND ZIA HAD STATED THAT THEY DID NOT INTEND TO DEVELOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THE INDIANS WERE APPARENTLY SATISFIED.

18. IRAN: NEWSOM DESCRIBED US EFFORTS TO REASSURE THE NEW GOVERNMENT THAT WE ACCEPT THE REVOLUTION. WE HAD NOT YET APPROACHED KHOMEINI DIRECTLY. IRAN'S REFUSAL TO ACCEPT OUR AMBASSADOR MADE COMMUNICATIONS MORE DIFFICULT AND THE CONTINUING EXECUTIONS GAVE US A PUBLIC RELATIONS PROBLEM. NEWSOM DESCRIBED SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS AS "TENSE".

19. IN REPLY, SHAHI STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING A PERSONAL EQUATION WITH KHOMEINI AND THE AYATOLLAH'S TOUCHINESS ABOUT CONTINUING ANY PROGRAM OR POLICY BEGUN BY THE SHAH. HE FELT THAT SENDING A DELEGATION TO KHOMEINI WOULD BE THE ONLY WAY TO IMPROVE US RELATIONS WITH THE PGOI, BUT RECOGNIZED THAT THIS COULD BE DIFFICULT FOR US IN TERMS OF US PUBLIC OPINION.

20. SHAHI MENTIONED THAT PGOI SUSPICIONS OF ANYTHING ESTABLISHED BY THE SHAH LED IT TO WANT TO ABOLISH THE RCD. HE SAID THAT PAKISTAN WAS TRYING TO SAVE THE ORGANIZATION. PAKISTAN WAS "EVALUATING" THE ROLE OF RCD, AND HOPED THAT THE RESULTS OF THIS STUDY WOULD PERSUADE THE IRANIANS THAT THE RCD HAD UTILITY IN FURTHERING REGIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION.

21. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, SHAHI NOTED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE EASY TO SET UP A NEW REGIONAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTION. THE PERSIAN GULF SHAIKHDOMS, WHICH WOULD LOGICALLY BE INCLUDED IN A NEW ORGANIZATION, WERE UNEASY ABOUT THE REVOLUTION IN IRAN AND WOULD THEREFORE PROBABLY BE NERVOUS ABOUT AN ORGANIZATION WHICH LINKED THEM WITH IRAN AND WHICH HAD IRAN IN SOME SORT OF LEADERSHIP POSITION.

22. PAKISTAN: OPENING THE DISCUSSION ON PAKISTAN'S SECURITY REQUIREMENTS. NEWSOM SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO KNOW HOW THE GOP THOUGHT IT COULD ASSIST PAKISTAN "IF WE ARE

ABLE TO RESOLVE THE PROBLEMS THAT CONFRONT US". NEWSOM INDICATED THAT THE US VIEWED PAKISTAN'S SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

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RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 8192

RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1997

RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 1389

RUMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 5138

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C O N F I D E N T I A L FINAL SECTION OF 04 STATE 277901/04

MENTS AS FALLING INTO THREE GENERAL CATEGORIES:

(A) THE DEVELOPMENT OF A HEALTHY BODY POLITIC AND THE SEARCH FOR BALANCED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT WERE FUNDAMENTAL TO ANY COUNTRY'S SECURITY. OBVIOUSLY THESE ARE ISSUES ON WHICH ONLY PAKISTANIS THEMSELVES CAN MAKE DECISIONS, BUT OTHER COUNTRIES CAN PROVIDE ECONOMIC AND TECHNICAL HELP TOWARD REACHING THESE GOALS.

(B) AN ADEQUATE MILITARY DEFENSE. OUR PERCEPTIONS OF WHAT IS ADEQUATE MAY DIFFER SOMEWHAT, BUT WE DO AGREE THAT CONSIDERABLE MODERNIZATION AND UPGRADING OF EQUIPMENT IS BADLY NEEDED. THESE REQUIREMENTS, HOWEVER, HAD TO BE WEIGHED AGAINST THE NEED FOR SOUND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

(C) IN THE DIPLOMATIC ARENA, A COUNTRY WITH LIMITED RESOURCES SUCH AS PAKISTAN ADDS TO ITS SECURITY VERY SIGNIFICANTLY BY SUSTAINING A NETWORK OF EXTERNAL TIES WHICH HELP TO BALANCE THOSE FORCES PAKISTAN FINDS INIMICAL TO ITS INTERESTS. OVER THE YEARS PAKISTAN HAD FOUND IT NECESSARY TO PURSUE A MIXTURE OF PRACTICAL DIPLOMACY DESIGNED TO LIMIT CONFRONTATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS AND EFFORTS TO GAIN DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT AMONG OUTSIDE POWERS.

23. WHILE THERE ARE SOME AREAS IN WHICH PAKISTAN OF NECESSITY WOULD HAVE TO DEPEND PRINCIPALLY ON ITS OWN RESOURCES, THE US HAD IN THE PAST TRIED TO BE RESPONSIVE IN ALL THREE GENERAL AREAS. TO THE EXTENT OUR OVERALL RELATIONS PERMIT IT, WE WOULD LIKE TO CONTINUE OUR SUPPORT IN EACH OF THESE AREAS.

24. PICKING UP THE THEME OF A "MIX" OF MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC MEASURES, SHAHI ASKED WHAT THE US WAS PREPARED TO DO TO ENHANCE PAKISTAN'S DEFENSE CAPABILITY. NEWSOM DESCRIBED THE LEGISLATIVE CONSTRAINTS ON JOF AID PROGRAM AND NOTED PROBLEMS WITH MAJOR MILITARY SALES REQUIRING CONGRESSIONAL ACQUIESCENCE. THE PAKISTANIS MADE CLEAR THAT INDIA REMAINED THE PRINCIPAL THREAT AGAINST WHICH PAKISTAN MUST PLAN ITS DEFENSE, AND SUGGESTED THAT THE ABSENCE OF A GOOD FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, SUCH AS F-16S, WAS THEIR KEY WEAKNESS. IN A DISCUSSION OF THE DIPLOMATIC ELEMENTS OF PAKISTANI SECURITY, THE US SIDE STRESSED ITS INTENTION TO CONTINUE TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT PAKISTAN'S INTERESTS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF ITS RELATIONS WITH THE MAJOR CONTINENTAL POWERS OF ASIA. WE ALSO SAID WE WOULD CONTINUE TO USE OUR INFLUENCE IN NEW DELHI TO ENCOURAGE INDIAN RESTRAINT AND COOPERATION WITH PAKISTAN. ON AFGHANISTAN, HE SAID WE

WOULD USE WHATEVER LEVERAGE WE HAD IN KABUL TO ENCOURAGE AFGHAN RESTRAINT RELATIVE TO PAKISTAN, AND THAT WE WOULD CONTINUE TO IMPRESS UPON THE SOVIETS THAT WE EXPECT THEM TO RESPECT AFGHAN INDEPENDENCE AND TO REFRAIN FROM INTERFERING IN AFGHAN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. THE US SIDE SPECIFICALLY AFFIRMED THAT THE 1959 BILATERAL AGREEMENT WITH PAKISTAN WOULD BE RELEVANT IN THE EVENT OF AGGRESSION FROM AFGHANISTAN. (FULLER DISCUSSION OF THIS SUBJECT IN SEPTEL.) VANCE

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